Tag Archives: transperancy

Reforming the Security Council: the question that won’t go away

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Last week Saudi Arabia took the unprecedented step of turning down the offer of a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, accusing the body of having failed in its “duties and … responsibilities in keeping world peace.” Saudi Arabia may have had the deadlock over Syria in mind, but it had the “work mechanisms and double standards” of the Security Council (UNSC) very firmly in its sights.

Saudi Arabia seems like a paradoxical place to be calling for reform of the Security Council. It has been the clarion call more recently of global justice campaigners and poorer, politically disenfranchised nations. But Turkey and France have also now added their voice to the controversy, France in particular expressing “frustration” over the Security Council’s non-response to the Syrian imbroglio.

Between them these countries have opened up a wider debate – wider than perhaps they realize, since the pertinence of the Syria issue is not simply about the inability of the UNSC to take action (to send in the peacekeepers). It is about the barrier that the Security Council has long presented to democratic international decision-making tout court.

Calls for reform of the UNSC and the much-maligned veto powers held by its five permanent members, the so-called P-5 countries of Russia, China, the United States, Britain and France, have a long history. Such calls were there at the Security Council’s inception, in fact, when Australia led a last ditch effort to limit the veto powers that Stalin had most strongly advocated. The UN General Assembly has its own open-ended Working Group looking at Security Council reform today – although the fact that this was first set up back in 1993 gives fair indication of the amount of headway it has achieved.

But for all that reform of the UNSC is an uphill struggle, the question keeps on being raised, primarily because what is done there goes right to the heart of the world’s major powers claim to the status of being ‘benign hegemons’ – or the purveyors of “partnership and cooperation” as Blair would have put it. Such claims have never stacked up well against the historical record. Which is why a little historical perspective is actually useful here, beginning with the rather unusual angle – literally – that Norway offers onto the workings of the Council.

Party to every decision taken behind the notoriously closed doors of the Security Council are the figures looking down on them from the mural that hangs over the Security Council Chamber. The mural depicts a phoenix arising from the ashes and was painted by the Norwegian artist Per Krogh. “The world we see in the foreground is collapsing, while the new world based on clarity and harmony can be built up,” Krogh said of his work in 1950.

In some senses he was at least five years too late with this vision that he had so carefully painted for the world, since the terms of the real new world order had largely been set in 1944: at Dumbarton Oaks and at Bretton Woods. In others he was at least half a century too early, since both clarity and harmony are still notable at the Security Council primarily by their absence. 

But Krogh’s mural has always been the perfect emblem for how we tend to think about the United Nations and the Security Council in particular – as the institutional backbone of a new world of civility as it arose from the ashes of the old in 1945. On this score at least the UN, no less than its member nations, has a founding mythology. And the claim that this particular body was the only conceivable institutional settlement for the post-1945 world order, the product of such greater common sense as had finally been beaten out of the world’s primary powers at the bloody end of the age of empire, flows naturally from it.

The reality of the founding of the UN, however which was at least as much about preserving the remnants of the imperial balance of powers, or at least the global pecking order that it bequeathed us, has always been rather different. And at the heart of that ‘actually existing’ UN is the way that the Security Council itself has gone about its task of promoting “peace and security” these past seven decades.

Inevitably, given the make up of the permanent members (Russia, China, United States, Britain, France) the veto was used frequently during the Cold War. But even in the post-Cold War era the veto has been a key weapon in the arsenal of the strong. Actual use of the veto by the US has helped prevent international sanctions against Israel’s settlements policy, while threat of veto has led to non-action or delayed action in Kosovo in 1999 and Darfur in 2005. Last year both Russia and China vetoed resolutions calling for sanctions against Syria. And Russia, not surprisingly, has been the most outspoken against Saudi Arabia latest stand last week.

Saudi Arabia is most concerned the impact of the Security Council and the power wielded by the veto power locally in relation to the regional concert of the Middle East. But calls for reform have been issued many times in recent years: be it by South Africa’s Jacob Zuma, the UN’s own Kofi Annan, or the United by Consensus group of countries agitating for expansion of the number of Council members.

But excluding the most immediately determining factor of national self-interest, what are the actual arguments for Security Council reform?

Very briefly summarized, they are the following. First, the fact that the current system is unrepresentative of the world’s peoples (though the Security Council is hardly the only part of the UN hit by this critique). All too often, the problems that come up for discussion in the Security Council tend to be problems in which the P5 have a direct interest.

Second, the Security Council is undemocratic in the way that it functions: the Council’s decisions are taken behind closed doors, the figures in Per Krogh’s painting notwithstanding, and as to process, the five permanent members are, on their own, able to stop a substantive Security Council resolution even when that is supported by all other members. The veto power can also be used to secure non-reciprocated privileges (the US has used it to obtain immunity from the ICC, for example). And the P5 retain a further veto right over any proposals for change.

A more basic criticism, however, is that it has effectively set in concrete a ‘great power’ and ‘grand alliance’ system of rule that was developed in the pre-WWII era even. The result is a rather serious anachronism at the heart of world politics. We are confronted by post-Cold War realities yet the single most powerful global body retains the preference for political horse-trading beloved of the diplomats and statesmen of 1815 and 1918.

Arguments for retaining the Security Council appeal to largely the same values: and herein lies a part of the problem in reforming it. They merely put those values to different tasks. To wit, the permanent members argue that to scrap the veto would be, in effect, to open up the most powerful part of the UN to mob rule (which is a pejorative way of saying it would be to democratize it). They argue, as George Bush did in 2002 that it’s purpose is not to be democratic but to put ‘words into action’: democracy runs counter to efficiency being the argument here.

International conservatives also point out that there are institutional safeguards already built into the system: the P5 are to use their powers only in accordance with wider objectives of “peace and security,” for example. This again is a largely rhetorical claim and conveniently ignores the fact that a good deal of reform could be carried out short of actually abolishing it. A more sophisticated defense is that it is better to include the post-WWII Great Powers in such a system. This is the ‘lesson’ of the League of Nations we are reminded over and again – or, when more imaginatively phrased, we are told that it is at least a good to bind their feet to the same fire every now and then, rather than leaving them free to pursue their interests on their own account outside any system. But if that is your argument then bring in Iran as a permanent member too. Bring in India and Pakistan. Bring in Israel and Palestine.

So what, then, are the chances of reform? Optimists will say that reform has happened before, as in 1963, when the number of non-permanent seats was increased from six to ten. But this was more concession, more tweak in fact, than actual reform. Pessimists point to the fact that any change requires the agreement of all five permanent members, who having recently banded together to affirm their belief in their own fitness to rule on behalf of others are unlikely in the extreme to permit any serious change at all.

But events like that taking place in Syria and responses like that of Saudi Arabia’s can shift the status quo in ways that are impossible to predict – precisely by putting words into action, albeit in ways that Bush Jr. never imagined. Should that prove to be the case – and to be sure the current opening of debate merely hints at the possibility – then one hopes it will be in ways that are beneficial albeit hard to imagine at present (which is just the shot in the arm the international system needs), rather than in ways that are unpleasant yet all too easy to imagine.

Mali: Humanitarian Challenges and Fragile Security, What Role for the UN?

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Despite heavy August rain, Gunhilde Utsogn (Special Assistant to the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, Mali) and John Karlsrud’s (NUPI) discussion on the humanitarian challenges facing Mail drew a large audience of academics, NGO workers, representatives from international organizations, embassies and the Norwegian armed forces to PRIO. Co-hosted by PRIO and NCHS, the seminar aimed to take stock of current developments in Mali and their ramifications for humanitarian action, as the war-torn country holds elections and welcomes the UN MINUSMA peacekeeping mission.

The events occurring in Mali are often presented as a fall-out from the Libya conflict: Northern Malians, who had for decades resided in Libya, returned to Mali well-trained and well-armed after the fall of Qadhafi. Northern Mali has a long history of Tuareg-rebellion against the Southern elite located in the capital Bamako, and has over the years seen a smuggler economy develop in the region, as it serves as a transit route for drug trafficking from South America to Europe as well as for weapons trafficking. Frustrated by the presidents’ handling of the rebellion, and by the rebels’ easy defeat of the Malian army; a faction of young officers seized power in a coup in March 2012. The Tuaregs took over control over the North of Mali in the power vacuum that followed, only to lose this control to the well-armed Islamists shortly after. The transitional president subsequently invited France to come to the rescue. In January 2013, French troops intervened militarily to stop the advance of the Islamists, following their capture of key towns in the North. Yet despite the military successes of the French troops breaking the Islamists’ control of this part of the country, the security situation remains volatile. In April, the UN Security Council agreed to send troops to take over from the French and African forces. This peacekeeping force, to which Norway has committed to contribute, began arriving last month. Meanwhile, an accord was signed between the Malian government and the Tuareg rebellion at the end of June in Ouagadougou. Despite some irregularities, the first round of presidential elections on July 28 saw a record turn-out of voters and the second round was conducted successfully on 11 August, leading to the victory of Ibrahim Boubacar Keita.

However, the humanitarian situation in the region remains highly precarious. For many observers, the challenge in Mali is not so much an emergency as a development crisis, where long term strategies are needed. Even before the 2012-events, food insecurity was chronic, with hundreds of thousands of malnourished children. The rainy season frequently brings cholera outbreaks. Yet, the conflict has undoubtedly exacerbated the problems: 800,000 children have already missed a school year. Despite the generosity of neighboring countries in opening their borders, the high number of Malian refugees in the region and the displaced population inside the country makes the situation even more fragile.

The key issue emerging from the debate between the speakers and the audience is whether the current UN mission, with its ambitious but highly aggressive mandate, is what Mali needs?

MINUSMA will be a fairly standard large multidimensional peacekeeping mission, with about 11200 troops, 1440 police and probably more than 1000 international and national civilian staff. The mandate authorizes MINUSMA to stabilize key population centers and to “deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas”. It should also create a secure environment and secure the main roads. The French troops in Serval will operate alongside MINUSMA “to intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA”. MINUSMA is also given a broad range of substantive tasks including security sector reform, demobilization and reintegration of armed rebels, including children, good offices, supporting an inclusive dialogue, and supporting the presidential and legislative elections.

Although the mandate is fairly aggressive if one reads between the lines, it is not as explicit as the mandate that recently was given to MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, the trend of increasingly assertive mandates given to peace operations, effectively turning these operations into peace enforcement operations is worrying. None of the traditional principles for UN peacekeeping will in effect apply – including consent of all the parties, the non-use of force and impartiality. MINUSMA is also tasked with supporting the new government in re-establishing or extending state authority and few if any will be in doubt about the fact that the mission will be partial. The human rights record of the national army is weak at best, and although the mandate includes a task in training the national army, human rights violations can be expected to continue, in turn also tainting MINUSMA.

It is also paradoxes that while the mandates for UN peacekeeping operations are becoming increasingly aggressive; the tolerance for losses of UN troops is going down. Since the bombings of the UN HQ in Baghdad in 2003, in Algeria in 2007, and other more recent attacks in Nigeria, Afghanistan and South Sudan, the UN has been criticized for its ‘bunkerisation’ – imposing increasingly strict security measures that in effect closes the UN off from contact with the local population. This is especially the case for the UN’s humanitarian agencies but also its civilian peacekeepers. Although the UN argues that this is not the case so far in Mali, only one successful terrorist attack can and will change this situation overnight. The increasing likelihood of “terrorist” attacks against aggressive UN peace “enforcement”, also means that attacks against other UN agencies operating in the same volatile area, or humanitarians for that matter, may increase.

Internally, the aggressive mandate of MINUSMA also deepens the schisms between the military, political and development components of the UN on the one hand, and the humanitarians on the other. From the humanitarian perspective, there is considerable concern that the peacekeeping mission will infringe on the humanitarian space (humanitarian agencies to operate safely and effectively on the ground) and compromise humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and universality, understood by humanitarians themselves as preconditions for gaining access to civilians in war-torn areas. UN humanitarian actors may soon find themselves imposed with escorts due to a tightening of security rules and the mandate to secure roads in the North. In what is still effectively a war zone, the different parts of the UN may very quickly come at odds with each other.

These concerns are well-known from debates on the costs of stabilization missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Over the last two decades, peacebuilding and stabilization programs have incorporated humanitarian aspects into their mandates, contributing to serious problems in the field for humanitarian actors.

Over the last decade a division of labor has developed between international organizations engaged in conflict and post-conflict situations in Africa. Regional and sub-regional organizations have engaged in the sharper end of conflicts with peace enforcement missions, e.g. in Somalia, while the UN has focused on the following phase of peacekeeping. Naturally, many cases blur this distinction, but in principle this has been a mutually good division of work. However, with the recent mandates for MONUSCO in DRC and MINUSMA in Mali, a worrying trend of a more aggressive UN is emerging. To sum up the discussion, a central question is if this aggressive peacekeeping is what Mali needs and which long-term consequences for humanitarian action can be expected?

PoC: The Politics of Counting Rape in Darfur

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During my fieldwork in Khartoum in February/March this year a paradoxical development was brought to my attention. The records of UNAMID, The African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur, indicate that sexual violence is on a decrease in Darfur. These records are, because of their sensitive nature, not open to the general public. Several interviews with both diplomats and humanitarian actors supported this assertion.

If sexual violence in Darfur is in fact on the decrease, that is good news indeed. But the validity of the assertion invites critical scrutiny.

Interviews conducted with humanitarian and political actors suggest that only the reporting of rape cases to UNAMID has gone down. Sudanese informants referred mockingly to UNAMID as “the African mistake in Darfur”, implying that the largest peacekeeping operation to date is not up to the task. They explain that the reporting to UNAMID has gone down because in 2009, the Sudanese government has expelled the humanitarian actors that were most active in referring cases to UNAMID and in speaking out publicly and bringing attention to the systematic and widespread rape in Darfur.

It is close to impossible to get research permits to Darfur for a Western researcher. But my interviews in Khartoum with International and Sudanese nationals active in Darfur before and after the expulsions suggest that the violence, including sexual violence, may actually be on the increase. In the words of a former minister from Darfur “the violence is escalating (…) It is out of control and it has become an everyday event by the police, the security, the Janjaweed and the rebels. The international community is deserting them. UNAMID is doing nothing. They are not protecting civilians. They cannot even protect themselves. (…)”.

The lack of reporting and the implicit conclusion that sexual violence might be on the decrease, potentially has significant political implications; it backs President Bashir’s claim that the evidence for the systematic and widespread sexual violence in Darfur was fabricated by the international community in an effort to undermine the Sudanese government.

Systematic and widespread sexual violence in Darfur: Government denial

In 2005, the UN published a report on sexual violence in Darfur concluding that the Government of the Sudan and the Janjaweed were responsible for widespread and systematic violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

An arrest warrant for Bashir was issued on 4 March 2009 indicting him on five counts of crimes against humanity (murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture and rape) and two counts of war crimes (pillaging and intentionally directing attacks against civilians). The indictment speaks to 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009) 1889 (2009) and 1960 (2010) on women, peace and security and acknowledges the sexualization of violence in Darfur. The President insists that the allegations of widespread and systematic rape were being fabricated for political purposes. In an interview with Lindsey Hilsum from Channel 4 Bashir argued that

“When it comes to mass rape, there is no document or evidence, just accusations (…). We are fully convinced that no rape took place. It might have happened at an individual level, but this is a normal crime that can happen in any country in the world. Mass rape does not exist.

Expulsion of humanitarian actors from Darfur

The Sudanese government’s reactions to this indictment have had dramatic repercussions for the humanitarian presence in Darfur, including within the area of gender based violence (GBV) programming.

Immediately following the ICC indictment, the Sudanese government expelled 13 international NGOs operating in Darfur and de-registered prominent national NGOs that between them employed nearly 40% of Darfur’s aid workers. The Vice-President stated that

“Whenever an organization takes humanitarian aid as a cover to achieve a political agenda that affects the security of the county and its stability, measures are to be taken by law to protect the country and its interests.”

Government officials made it clear that they would fill the void left by the International NGOs with “national and friendly foreign NGOs”.  In addition to the international NGOs that were expelled, the Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) de-registered three Sudanese NGOS; the Amal Centre for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence, the Khartoum Centre for Human Rights Development and Environment and the Sudan Social Development Organization (SUDO).

The Sudanese government harbours a particular antipathy towards those humanitarian actors that address gender-based violence, and/or speak out publicly about rape cases. As a consequence, a humanitarian worker explains “The meetings in the GBV cluster used to be packed. Now they are empty (…)”.

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) was accused of spying for the ICC. In 2005, MSF published The Crushing Burden of Rape,  a report  on the widespread sexual violence in Darfur. MSF reported treating nearly 500 rape survivors from October 2004 to early February 2005. Two senior members of MSF Holland were arrested charged with espionage and publishing false information. In 2006, the Norwegian Refugee Council was expelled from Darfur after publishing a report on 80 cases of rape around Kalma Camp in southern Darfur. Khartoum claimed the findings were false.

In 2013, one of the major concerns on the ground is the diminished capacity on reporting on GBV violations. In the words of an activist from Darfur:

“The arrest warrant of Bashir has affected our work in Darfur. The word ‘protection of civilians‘ became very sensitive. If we use that term then the government thinks that we are collecting rape cases and reporting them to the ICC.  With the ICC, reporting of rape has become more difficult. (…)”.

Similarly, according to an international organization working within the area of GBV violence in Darfur; The gaps left by the expulsion of 13 NGOs following the announcement of the arrest warrant for President al-Bashir in March 2009, remain. (…) The expulsion of the International NGOs has significantly reduced the capacity for monitoring and referrals, as well as diminished the reporting capacity on GBV issues”.

International NGOs as political tools?

The International NGOs most forceful in the work and advocacy on GBV has been expelled. Remaining humanitarian agencies openly admit their reluctance to speak out about sexual violence. Because of government restrictions and intimidation, it is increasingly difficult for the remaining actors to work within the field of GBV without the risk of expulsion. As a consequence the reporting of rape to UNAMID has gone down. This poses an ethical dilemma to the remaining International NGOs:  On the one hand, if the government restricts or even blocks work on GBV, the humanitarian NGOs can still provide vital services in water, sanitation, and food security. On the other hand, by keeping silent on GBV, do the remaining humanitarian actors, described by the government as ‘friendly foreign NGOs’,  simply serve as political tools for Bashir in his claim that ‘Mass rape does not exist’ in Darfur?